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ABSTRACT
This paper examines R&D management as it might be performed under an
output-oriented approach in which the company's needs for innovations in
various product and production areas were identified, information collected
on various ways of satisfying these needs, including R&D. A company's R&D
program would be the aggregate of its needs in various areas of its busi-
ness. The spirit behind the approach is that of applying the PPB (planning,
programming and budgeting) approach to R&D. The paper summarizes the state
of theory on R&D decision making in economics.
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Approaches to Research and Development Management
The purpose of this paper is to review some implications of certain
trends in industrial research and development management policies. The focal
point is the long-standing conflict between self direction by scientific or
engineering professionals in the corporate setting, and the effects on it
of the escalating tendency for non R&D management to bring all operations,
including R&D, under control. The history of industrial research and develop-
ment has been partly one of reconciliation of the traditions of scholarship
and professionalism with the management practices of industry.
With the passage of time, management control practices have generally
become more regularized and complete. The desire to include R&D within the
general system of control is long-standing, as Anthony's description of 1952
indicated,1 but current discussions over the manner in which corporate control
over R&D operations should be exercised is on a quite different footing than
it was a generation ago.
Among widely espoused philosophies of management are those tagged by
the phrase "management by objectives." This paper seeks to consider the
implications of extending such philosophies to R&D as an instrument of general
management. The R&D man's long-standing argument is that close control is
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actually destructive of R&D effectiveness, and the nature of R&D has enabled
him to put his argument on a unique footing. The objectives in the minds of
advocates of "management by objectives" arenot those of R&D itself but of the
business organization as a whole, and there is inherent in their thinking that
R&D would be treated as one tool that might then be examined in the light of
the total business's objectives. It is notorious that distinct functional
groups in larger organizations have objectives of their own, apart from those
of the organization as a whole. The dual role of the scientific and engineer-
ing professional as a member of a profession and of an organization have made
both the business and scholarly community aware of peculiarly acute problems
of reconciliation. One consequence of management by objectives is that the
objectives of functional groups become even more vigorously subordinated to
the objectives of top management. While in general, this may contribute to
organizational effectiveness, it may not do so uniformly or for such functions
as R&D.
Perhaps the most explicit and publicized, though not the first, system
of management by objectives has been the programming, planning and budgeting
system (PPB) which first became popular in the Federal government, spreading
later to state and local government and then to industry. The essential idea
is structuring the entire spectrum of activities according to output cate-
gories, and analyzing, managing and budgeting all efforts directed toward any
specific goal as an entity. In theFederal government where half a 
dozen
departments and agencies might have overlapping responsibilities, this 
approach
was conceived initially as a remedy for the consequences of fragmented responsi-
bility. It was proposed that bringing together activities related by objective
as was largely done in the creation of a new Department of Transportation,
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would create a high-level management better able to perceive needed balances,
as between types of transportation, and modes of satisfying transportation
needs. Applied in the context of industry, PPB might be called output, or
needs-orientation.
Needs orientation does not, in the first instance, refer to needs for
R&D,finance, production, marketing; these are functions, all of which are
elements in meeting any number of differing needs, such as may revolve
around a customer type, a product category or a market group.
With a needs-oriented approach, the purpose of each functional group in
the company, including R&D, is to play the role that emerges from an integrated,
system-approach type of analysis which seeks to identify the most efficient
way in which various needs can be met. A company would identify a spectrum
of needs--not, of course, unrelated to each other--and each would be served
by a program implemented jointly by a number of functional groups; thus, each
functional group would participate in several different programs, and would con-
struct for itself an efficient overall program composed of its efforts in all
combined. None of the requisite program development could be implemented
without taking account of complex interactions among the activities of a functional
group and between functional groups. Further, needs themselves would be met
less than completely as pushing too hard to satisfy one would--beyond a cer-
tain point--mean giving up too much of another. Rationality in a needs-oriented
approach means in the first instance identifying alternatives to needs satis-
faction, and then objectively evaluating and selecting the best alternatives,
given the context of the organization as a whole. Trade-offs between various
types of needs satisfaction would be identified by scrutinizing the implications
within various functional elements of the company and summing up the totals.
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Were this approach to be followed, the implications for R&D would be an
R&D program whose content and composition were derived ultimately from company
needs as these had been determined and analysed by management-wide analysis
of the means by which they could best be met. Thus, when a needs oriented
approach is substituted for the better known approach in which R&D proposes
a program which is reviewed and approved by top management, there are sub-
stantial new constraints on the ability of R&D management to articulate its
own R&D program.
The common approach by R&D organization and management can be called
R&D oriented, although the term is somewhat of an overstatement. It tends to
put emphasis on a high quality, viable R&D community in the corporate set-
ting, with skills distributed among relevant disciplines, by intellectual
level, and by experience level. Maintenance of an efficient and relevant
scientific community, with considerable autonomy and independence, and exer-
cising considerable initiative in laying out its own program of work is a
paramount consideration in the R&D programs proposed by such organizations.
The ground rules under which such organizations operate embody what has
become the classic reconciliation of the conflicting needs of scientific pro-
fessionalism with the needs of the supporting company. It would appear that
to some extent this reconciliation is threatened by new emphasis on needs
orientation.
The heart of the R&D program under the classic approach consists of
projects with rather specific schedules, end points and budgets, and generally
specific results sought. R&D programs are put together by R&D management
with the assistance of other R&D personnel and with general guidance from
company management as to the scale of the program, but very little as to
its actual content. A balance is sought along the spectrum of basic research,
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applied research and development, and a balance among efforts on product
improvement, new products, manufacturing and other processes (e.g., packaging
and distribution), and materials. There may be some advance indication from
management as to the directions in which it wishes to go, and in which R&D support
would be appropriate. Typically R&D management makes a presentation of an R&D
program of its own creation to top management as part of the annual budgeting
cycle.
This, then, is the R&D oriented program approach, and it will be recognized
as the most common R&D practice among American companies with significant
R&D programs. The focus of top management review is on whether R&D management
has put together a well-conceived and balanced package which takes adequate
account of the broad range of company needs for technological innovation,
as well as it can be understood by non technical management. If it has, from
the standpoint of top company management, R&D management has performed well.
If it is necessary to trim budgets, R&D management is expected in the first
instance to determine where within the R&D program any budget cutting allocated
to R&D will fall. If the proposed R&D program is poorly received by top
management and is cut punitively, R&D management is likely to make an initial
proposal of how cuts should be distributed among elements of the R&D program.
The procedure has, indeed, some powerful advantages, among which are
that it allows R&D management to organize and maintain a high-quality R&D
organization, with high-calibre personnel who have developed areas of
expertise in depth upon which they can draw as particular circumstances
require. Stability, personal growth and institutionalization of R&D are
accompaniments of the process. It is perhaps the operating mode in which
R&D in industry most resembles academic R&D and lends itself to the college-
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like R&D park sometimes supported by large companies. It is a means for
minimizing the strains and conflicts confronting the scientist in industry as
described by Kornhauser.2 There is ample evidence that the competence and
quality of the R&D organization are, for the R&D group, ends in themselves,
though certainly not exclusive ones. Closely related are the goals of making
contributions to general scientific knowledge, and it would be wrong to ignore
the strong desire of R&D personnel to contribute to their companies as well.
With a needs oriented approach is meant a situation in which the initiative
for R&D effort has been shifted significantly out of the hands of R&D management.
Marketing, production, etc. may undertake analyses of corporate problems
perceived from their point of view, and define those changes which they feel
will resolve them. For example, a competing manufacturer may have added a
feature to his product and the task levied on "R&D" may be to duplicate it in
the company's products. Needs oriented approaches need not consist entirely
of such fire-drill requests. Following is one possible long range needs
oriented approach to R&D program definition.
Company management may have concluded that over the years its competitors
as well as itself will produce new models of certain products with superior
features, style changes, using new materials and production techniques. The
company's market share as a function of time will depend on the characteristics
of its products, its prices, its marketing and merchandising generally. The
planning problem is to sequence a mix of activities that will enhance or
maintain the company's position--and profitably. Advertising, merchandising,
pricing, and product improvement through R&D are among the mix of techniques
for achieving a target market share--perceiving these alternatives as continuing
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efforts. Market potential, competition, production costs, as they are at
present and as they may be in the future can be analyzed. Given profitability
as an objective, company strategy is developed from information on these points.
In short, through long-range planning a requirement for a continuing flow of
technical results can be identified. This, then, becomes the basis for creation
of a stable and technologically growing R&D organization.
The crucial point with such approach is that the underlying question being
asked is, what mix of activities will best achieve company goals in the area
in question. An element of an R&D program comes into being only when it has
withstood the comparison with seeking new outlets, advertising, cost cutting,
price changes, and the like.
On the other hand, when an R&D program is initiated by the R&D organization
the starting question is quite different: what are the best things which the
R&D program can do for the company. It seems intuitively clear that the
technical content of R&D programs created under these differing approaches
will be somewhat different--as will be the manner in which the R&D program is
presented for top management approval--although certainly .here would be many
common elements.
Further, the identification of needs for new or improved products does
not automatically translate into a program for its R&D laboratory. The
company that truly explores all alternatives will seek out all means by which
it might meet new product needs. Among them may well be acquisition of other
companies, licensing products developed by others, contracting with outside
R&D organizations. A needs oriented company is one that has no predisposition
to favor one route over the other except as cost, results, and other consi-
derations indicates one approach to be superior to the others. No such open
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minded exploration of alternatives is likely where an R&D program initiates
with an R&D organization. It is likely to see its program proposal as its bid
for support for the coming year, and to assiduously ignore alternative approaches
to technological innovation, not to mention such alternatives to R&D as advertising,
and so on.
Implications for Special Tasks for R&D in the Needs Oriented Company
In a needs-oriented company, the requirements laid on its R&D group are
for those things for which performance by an internal company R&D group has
been identified as the best source.
Needs orientation is indeed likely to have some impact on the internal
structure of an R&D group. First, the impact on the initiative of the R&D
personnel in project selection has been noted. Under needs orientation, non
R&D functional groups will be much more deeply involved in specific R&D project
review, and their function will be evaluative of approaches developed by all
possible efforts contributory to needs satisfaction of which company R&D
will be one. Second, there will be a need for substantially more interaction
between R&D personnel and the rest of the company in development of project
proposals. R&D should, in the process, get a much clearer idea of what the
company really needs, and it should, with adequate feedback, learn to make
explicitly responsive proposals for R&D reflecting an understanding of
company needs. These proposals would be reviewed by the management in com-
petition with non R&D alternatives. R&D would tend to have a great advantage
over non-internal R&D sources from a superior information flow. There is no
reason why such alternatives as licensing and acquisitions should be given
preferential treatment, though they should be guaranteed their full due by
having advocates who are not over-committed to the R&D organization.
-9-
There are some interesting management problems with R&D in such a role.
Preparing proposals takes resources. It is inherent in an internalized com-
petitive process that R&D should not expect to win all competitions. On the
other hand, if not enough proposals ~were prepared, general management would
fail to obtain information on the full spectrum of opportunities. Clearly it
will be in the company interest, as well as of the R&D group, that R&D take
the initiative of volunteering unrequested proposals as well as responding to
requests. Perhaps some target ratio of proposal acceptance is appropriate,
the exact number depending on how elaborate the proposals are, and the fallout
benefits (which may be considerable) from unsuccessful proposal efforts.
From the R&D standpoint, proposal preparation is an expensive marketing
proposition--ostensibly part of overhead--and accounting procedures might
lead R&D to adopt a policy toward internal proposal effort which was too
conservative. One remedy would be to share costs with other functions.
Thus, the work of the R&D group, under a needs oriented approach includes
not only the explicit carrying out of approved R&D projects with specific
goals, but considerable speculative exploration supportive of determining
what might be carried out. Laboratory work as well as proposal writing might
both be undertaken. Thus, the work of the R&D organization would fall into
two categories: the identification and conceptualization of projects, and
the implementation of approved projects. This dichotomy exists today, but
it would likely become much more explicit in a needs oriented approach and
the "proposal effort" more extensive than is now common for non-contractual R&D.
Is Needs Orientation A Better Approach?
At this point, the crucial question must be faced, are there indeed net
benefits in a needs oriented approach? Stated otherwise, is it not possible
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that needs can actually be better satisfied by the better established R&D
oriented approach? It might even be reasonably asked, whether at the bottom
there are any differences in the two approaches, in the sense that they would
materialize as different technological mixes, different projects and different
management practices.
It is nowadays sometimes forgotten that the project system for R&D
management was once under sharp attack. Mees saw it as an approach which
"regards research as a business which can be organized and, while recognizing
that some of the projects will fail, proposes that the successful ones should
carry the failures." 3 Today most management would agree that that is how they
wish to deal with R&D. Mees favored an earlier model, "in which the manage-
ment, having hired an expert in the field (of R&D) leaves it to him and to his
men to spend the funds in the hope that the company will get an adequate
return." He calculated that the costs of additional administration and
diversion of scientists' time into the meetings and reports required is such
that the project system could not be superior unless at least 40 percent of
scientists time with the less structured system had been misdirected, which
he doubted. Mees attributed the growing prevalence of the project system
to the anxiety of management to supervise the work of the research department,
and further suggested that while it may greatly reduce "errors of commission"
it greatly increases "errors of omission."
The Mees strategy for R&D was to obtain the best possible personnel, give
them the facilities and support they ask for, make them aware of the company's
operations and needs, and leave them to their own discretion as to how they
will make their contribution. They may be able to identify tasks, from their
technical knowledge, that non R&D personnel could never conceive of.
Especially where the gap in knowledge between the layman and scientist is
great, the tasks proposed by non scientists are likely to fall far short of
the potential and it is precisely because of their interest in working full
potential that good scientists will depart from organizations which set them
to work on pedestrian tasks. The past record of industrial R&D certainly
suggests that close direction of R&D by non technical management particularly
in project selection, results in low grade R&D. Along with spectacular
examples of creative industrial R&D laboratories staffed with top-flight
personnel and producing impressive technical results, hundreds of technical
groups in companies which have rejected the idea of supporting a self-directed
R&D establishment, but have maintained technical groups to respond to technique
production and product problems which come to the attention of non technical
management, and which are responded to in their terms. It is not possible to
be definitive as to the contribution of such technical groups, since they have
rarely been thought interesting enough to be studied in detail. Undoubtedly
most have earned their keep. Not uncommonly, however, companies and industries
which have carried their support of R&D no further have lost out to more
technologically oriented firms or industries. There is reasonable grounds for
believing that the technical or R&D groups which are strongly dominated by
non R&D management have failed to make the technological contributions which
might have been made, and that their companies have suffered in consequence.
A Reconciliation
If, then, the present trends toward needs orientation in R&D are not to
have adverse effects on the productivity of industrial R&D they must clearly
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take forms and have consequences quite different from that of the traditional
low-technology industry; indeed, the R&D practices of low-technology industry
can be taken as examples to be avoided.
It seems entirely possible that output orientation supported by thorough-
going systems analysis in which R&D personnel fully participate may indeed
reconcile industry's desire for R&D control with the desire of R&D personnel
for self direction in ways which are compatible with high quality R&D per-
formance in industry.
There can be a project system allowing initiative to R&D coupled with needs
orientation if R&D management is given primary responsibility for articulating
the R&D response to needs, doing so in intra grouping competition with other
groups--independent from R&D and hence not overly committed to the R&D organ-
ization in its present form. Since the success of an innovation is never
dependent exclusively on the efforts of R&D, a complete proposal under the
initiative of R&D requires inputs from other functional parts of the organization.
For the approach prepared here to work, R&D must have access to such resources
on its own terms. The sociological study of R&D has come up with some findings
that suggest that it should indeed be possible to reconcile periodic internal
proposal efforts, as it is translated into demands upon R&D, with the type of
work environment in which professional attitudes flourish. For example, Pelz
and Andrews find that a moderate multiplicity of tasks raises productivity,
although carried too far it is destructive.4 Occasional participation by R&D
personnel in internal proposals may well be intellectually stimulating. Some
isolation is essential if continuing efforts are not to be disrupted excessively
by fire drills--the frequency of high-priority emergency technical problems
is sometimes cited as the reason production-oriented technology is generally
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removed from R&D laboratories and put directly under production management.
But isolation can be stultifying as well. Many companies have been diligent.
to keep R&D personnel aware of company needs without levying explicit required
tasks, and have been rewarded with a flow of creative proposals.
One of the attractive possibilities in needs oriented approaches is that
it may lead to more effective interaction between R&D and other groups of the
company. This would be most expected where analytical capabilities within the
various functions not immersed in day-to-day problems, if it can be assumed
that the most effective interaction will be on the analytical level. With a
needs oriented approach it is feasible to lay out the general aspects of a
program for an internal R&D group well in advance.
Conclusion
In the context of present R&D management practices, Mees' argument for
something less structured than a project approach to R&D management is a relic
of the past. What Mees called the project system has emerged as an approach
under which the initiative for R&D program content lay primarily with R&D
management. Increasingly this initiative has been threatened by procedures under
which the initiative of non R&D management would be strengthened, placing R&D
management and personnel in the position of being more constrained in the
articulation of the total corporate R&D program.
The content of an R&D program proposed initially by R&D management is,
of course, relevant to company needs. It differs from the output oriented
approach in that it has not been so rigorously screened by a comparison with
non-R&D alternatives. Mees' objections to the project system, although perhaps
overstated, were real enough and the problems he cited could be worsened under
a needs-oriented approach. To compare the cost and effectiveness of the needs
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oriented R&D program with his Steinmetzian concept is pointless: the viable
comparison today is between the presently dominant project system in which the
initiative lies with R&D management and a needs oriented system. Undoubtedly
needs orientation would mean a further reduction in time of engineers and
scientists at the bench, and it is by no means clear that improvement in results
would be sufficient compensation for the lost time. Casual distractions and
elaborate reporting requirements can be far more destructive of R&D effectiveness
than the mere time involved would indicate, and many companies have failed to
obtain or keep high quality R&D through such practices. Any gains in needs
oriented management must be weighed against such losses especially if R&D
management style affects the quality of engineers and scientists a company can
hire. That is, adisorderly collection of geniuses may very well outperform
a well managed collection of dullards.
Clearly there are instances in which a high quality R&D group, with
considerable self-initiative, even though made aware of the company and its
problems, has spent part of its time on topics of scientific interest but
no direct company relevance: on the other hand, how is anyone to know they are not
relevant without exploring them first? R&D may misconstrue the company's
needs and interests and work out unuseable new product and process ideas:
some of these might have been abandoned at the onset given a little inquiry
from operating management, but perhaps operating management often is overly
quick to reject as unwanted or impracticable what it later finds indispensable.
While perhaps the occasional Steinmetz's of industrial research may
combine genius with a deep perception of what is good for the company and
ability to work self-directed toward that end, the majority of industrial
researchers are made of a more common clay. The R&D oriented approach looks like
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a judicious compromise between giving the scientific personnel their heads
subject to careful indoctrination into the company and its problems, and a
stultifyingly rigid control. It should not be discarded lightly.
The alternative, implied by the needs oriented approach carried to an
unreasonable extreme, is an R&D group that never seeks to give the company any-
thing beyond general management's conceptual capability, narrowed as it is by
ignorance of emerging technology and by concentration on day-to-day tasks.
Especially in low technology industries, R&D personnel are likely to be among
the most creative-minded people in a company and may be the principal professional-
level resource available to management able to combine creative impulses with
the technical knowledge which makes creativity productive. There is clearly
implicit in the needs orientation approach the possibility that R&D personnel
will become more narrowly focused. There is also the possibility that management
control rigidly implemented by "bean counters" will close off opportunities for
exploratory thinking and the under-the-table activity that is so uniformly
credited with many of the technological achievements of R&D laboratories.
The dichotomy between need orientation and balanced program bears some
resemblance to that of the project group versus functional group approaches
to organization familiar in the R&D management literature. At the heart of
that controversy was the argument that giving priority to the individual
project, with personnel from all technological skills and all management
functions pooled under project management was an effective approach to R&D.
This approach turned out-to be expensive and to use people inefficiently as a given
project moves from one phase to another, requiring differing skill mixes,
but it often succeeded in accelerating R&D when cost considerations could be
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set aside. To organize personnel by functional groups, each concerned with
a mix of projects, makes more efficient use of the personnel, but tends to
make project goals subservient to those of the functional group and to use
people more effectively. Very much the same points are involved in the R&D
oriented versus needs oriented policies outlined above.
-17-
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APPENDIX
Reports on the 1971-72 Study of Research and
Development in Industry
Dialogues with Management on Research and Development
This report presents edited extracts of tape recordings
made of interviews with management respecting their
R & D activity as of late 1971. The material is
organized topically, so as to present a number of points
of view in the same general area. (MON 21)
Output Orientation in R & D--A Better Approach?
This paper examines R & D management as it might be
performed under an output-oriented approach in which
the company's needs for innovations in various product
and production areas were identified, information
collected on various ways of satisfying these needs,
including R & D. A company's R & D program would be
the aggregate of its needs in various areas of its
business. The spirit behind the approach is that of
applying the PPB (planning, programming and budgeting)
approach to R & D. The paper summarizes the state of
theory on R & D decision making in economics. (MON 22)
Research, Development and Financial Performance
This study is a cross-sectional analysis of the
relationship between financial performance and R & D
funding, using first-differences 1970-71 normalized
by company size for financial variables and reported
percentage change in R & D funding for total and
government-funded R & D for the R & D variables.
Changes in company net worth were best explained by
financial performance; company R & D funding was not
significant; however government R & D funding was
marginally significant. Among financial variables,
sales and working capital were the most significant
determinants of R & D funding. The conclusion is
drawn that as of 1970-71 the financial community
discounted R & D as a factor in company performance.
(MON 23)
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Research, Development and Business Conditions, 1960-71
This study reports econometric analyses of data
supplied by 28 companies for various years 1960-71,
which have been pooled for all-industries analyses,
and for separate analyses by industry groups of
firms. Data have been deflated by GNP and normalized
for company size. R & D has been examined for statis-
tically significant relationships with financial
variables, and government R & D funding. Company R & D
funding were not consistently associated at statisti-
cally significant levels with any one financial
variable. Government R & D funding and "independent
R & D" support were generally significant. The strength
of the government-private interaction seems to have
peaked about 1965. (MON 24)
The Sensitivity of Types of Research and Development to
Business Conditions
This report deals with the results of econometric
investigations loosely patterned after those of
Horowitz, Hamberg and Grabowski dealing with determi-
nants of R & D funding in industry. However, the
variables are not actual financial figures but scaled
psychometric responses from executives in 54 companies
during a spring 1972 survey of R & D in industry,
on such topics as the impact of business conditions
on sales, profits, cash position. It appears that
"general business conditions" is more significant
than any one financial variable alone, perhaps
because of its more comprehensive nature. Separate
analyses are presented for the non-electrical and
electrical machinery industries, for government-
sensitive firms, and for those companies with only
a single R & D laboratory. It is possible to explore
the sensitivity of some different types of R & D,
and that from most to least sensitive the order is
basic research, product improvement R & D, new
product R & D, process-oriented R & D. (MON 25)
Patterns of Association in Research and Development
This study focuses on the scaled responses of
executives in 54 firms interviewed in spring 1972
to a series of questions on company performance,
financial conditions, current R & D performance
and R & D planning, as it was affected by recent
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business conditions. R & D ranked after general
belt tightening, capital expenditures, and overhead
activities as an area of sensitivity to adversity.
The "R & D program as a whole" was most sensitive,
followed by new product R & D, basic research and
R & D program balance. Process-oriented R & D was
least sensitive. Simple non-parametric tests were
applied to responses sorted by strength of response
on 20 questions, and results are reported. A
factor analysis confirmed that firms tend to treat
their R & D programs as an entity rather than tieing
the new product component of R & D to strength of
new-product needs, process oriented R & D to process-
improvement needs, etc. The government dependent
firms were especially hard hit, and were especially
likely to tie their R & D funding to the level of
sales. Effects of R & D were often strong with firms
experiencing a severely weakened cash position. (MON 26)
Patterns of Impact and Response in Research and Development
in Industry: Summary of a Study
This report is an "executive" summary of a series
of analyses of R & D in industry based on econometric
analysis of data on R & D funding, financial
variables, and government R & D funding. Taking
the economists' model of rational profit-oriented
decision-making, it examines the effect of R & D
on market valuation of the stock of companies, of
financial conditions on R & D funding on both stock
valuation and R & D funding. It explores patterns
of association in R & D performance. The conclusions
are that R & D has no favorable current effect on
stock valuation, that R & D funding suffers when
financial performance is poor, and becomes somewhat
more short-range in its focus, and that product and
process oriented portions of R & D programs tend
to increase or decrease together. (MON 27)
Description of Methodology in 1971-72 Study of Research
and Development in Industry
This report supplies details of the samples obtained
in the various phases of this study, some statistical
summaries, examples of questionnaires and various form
letters used. It is not a treatment of study metho-
dology in general, and is intended only to supplement
the various reports in the series on the 1971-72 study.
